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As long as there has been academic psychology, there has been the lament about the 
fragmentation and reduction of its subject matter—if we assume for a moment that there 
has ever been agreement about what its subject matter is. It is true, there have been only 
very few developed attempts to take a stand against the parochial and reductionist tenden-
cies and to conceptually synthesize the numerous psychological fields of study concerned 
with the human being in the world; and there have been even fewer that have tackled this 
undertaking in both a systematically and historically comprehensive manner. It is also 
true that psychology as an academic institution does not foster the kind of intellectual 
mind set required for such an enterprise. After all, its claim is to be scientific and not 
historical, experimental and not conceptual, evidence-based and not self-reflexive (again, 
let’s assume for a moment that these are real oppositions).
But there are a few exceptions, psychology-theorists profoundly familiar with both 
intellectual cultures. One is Kurt Danziger. In the world of contemporary academia, 
Danziger’s work is unique. It blends immense knowledge of the history (and pre-history) 
of psychological research with likewise immense knowledge of psychology’s conceptual 
and cultural history; it combines discussion of empirical experimentation with its discourse 
analysis; and it draws on registers of historical erudition and philosophical acumen unusual 
in many human sciences and very rare in psychology. In today’s psychology, Kurt Danziger 
appears like one of the small number of scholars from ancient Athens who, after Greece 
was defeated, were able continue their work in Rome, reminding the Romans of a civiliza-
tion so different from theirs.
After his path-breaking historical discourse analyses of the emergence of his discipline, 
Constructing the Subject: Historical Origins of Psychological Research (1990), and of 
the conceptual building material that made this construction possible, Naming the Mind: 
How Psychology Found its Language (1997), Danziger has presented a new work on the 
history of memory that is similarly magisterial in scope and execution. History, however, 
has a different meaning here than in traditional historical accounts of scientific research. 
Almost always, psychology has investigated whatever it conceived as its subject-matter 
as though it belonged to an ahistorical human nature. What is seen as changing are the 
different theories about this subject which, in the classical picture, are precursors of the 




respective present theory which is considered to be the only truly scientific one. To a very 
large extent, this scientific progress narrative still represents the epistemological conscious-
ness of the laboratory world of psychological memory research, irrespective of all objec-
tions and criticisms from historians and philosophers of science.
The understanding of history that Danziger unfolds in Marking the Mind: A History 
of Memory breaks radically with this picture. Challenging the idea, common not only in 
psychology and neuroscience, of human memory as a species-wide and generic, biologi-
cally given capacity, memory is historicized on three levels. The first level, interestingly 
enough, is approached from an evolutionary perspective. It turns out, however, that most 
of our specific human practices of remembering and forgetting have not emerged through 
biological adaptation. Like language and other practices of human sign-mediated com-
munication, they have come into existence in a process of biological-cultural co-evolution 
in which the cultural dynamic became more and more dominant. Skills such as writing 
and social technologies such as literacy developed entirely as cultural, and not biological, 
achievements; and so did the kind of cognition they involved and the institutional organi-
zation they entailed. But literacy and memory are not just loosely linked. One of Danziger’s 
main theses is that they are intrinsically intertwined. Only after the emergence of writing 
and the establishment of a culture of literacy in ancient Greece was “memory” named, 
perceived, and defined—as in the writings of Plato and Aristotle—as a distinguishable 
feature. What is more, it became an entity on its own. At least to those able to write and 
to read it seemed that with writing definitive versions of verbal texts, mnemonic inscrip-
tions that could be kept, re-read, and reproduced could be brought into existence.
Before the written conceptualization of “memory” as an individual and internal faculty, 
people conceived of the temporal and transient dimension of their reality in terms of 
remembering activities that were (often indistinguishably) embedded in their forms of 
life. In early Greece, as Homer and Hesiod reported, mnemonic practices dwelt in the 
public space of conversation and interaction, of poetry, song, dance, ritual performance, 
and artifacts of art and architecture. The first meaning of mnemosyne is not “memory” 
but rather “remembrance,” the exercise of an activity within a community. But with its 
written conceptualization, memory activities changed their location, taking up their abode 
in the individual mind. Locked up in the internal world of the person and reified in the 
form of a specific object called memory, they were reduced to just one element of a far 
more complex set of social practices. While early on, remembering meant listening to and 
understanding a voice, after the introduction of written records it meant looking something 
up in an inscribed record, which implied evaluating if and how accurate the inscription 
was read or “recalled.” In this way, a broad spectrum of cultural practices of remembering 
and forgetting transformed into an aspect of cognition, of true or false knowledge.
One of the most amazing phenomena Danziger’s historical memory parcour brings 
into prominence is that this idea, which is based on the experience of writing as a practice 
to preserve knowledge and experience—a practice of inscribing (“encoding”), preserving 
(“storing”), and reading (“decoding” or “retrieving”) “information”—has served for more 
than 2000 years as metaphor, model, and empirical confirmation of the most fundamental 
Western idea of memory, namely as a storage, an archive of the past. No doubt, this is a 
long parcour. It follows the various gestalts of memory from Greek and Roman Antiquity 
(paying particular attention to Plato, the originator of the seemingly indestructible 
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inscription metaphor for memory), Christian Middle Ages, the Renaissance, and Modern 
Times, to figures crucial for the 20th century sciences of memory such as Ebbinghaus and 
the members of the Göttingen School of experimental research who have determined the 
shape of academic memory psychology until today’s cognitive and neuroscientific models. 
With each step in the development of new technologies of storing and inscription—based 
on materials such as stones, wax tablets, parchment, paper, books, libraries, print, pho-
tography, magnetic tape, film, digital computers, the internet, and technologies of brain 
imagining—new memory metaphors and models became available, even if all support 
the same basic vision of inscription and archive.
Still, it is astonishing to see how many different metaphors, models, and theories have 
been put forward to give shape to the peculiar idea of a storage container of the past. This 
plethora of conceptualizations—attempts at “domesticating memory,” as Danziger puts 
it—marks a second level on which memory is historicized. From the very onset, writers, 
philosophers, scholars, and scientists have continuously re-constituted “memory” as an 
object of human knowledge and reflection. Traditionally, this is the focus of Geistesgeschichte 
or conceptual history, as well as of the more specific history of psychology (even if his-
torians of psychology have for the most part ignored the study of memory). But Danziger’s 
interest goes further. His point of departure is the insight that theoretical conceptions of 
memory, with all their pre-theoretical presuppositions, hidden metaphors, and unexplained 
philosophical assumptions, do not constitute an isolated domain, but are always to be seen 
in accordance with the exigencies and requirements of their time. These requirements are 
all but merely conceptual and academic. They reach beyond the field of theory and its 
history to the field of technology and that of culture, both with their own respective his-
tories. At stake, then, is the particular constellation in which memory concepts, material 
technologies, institutional and cultural practices, performances of remembrances, and 
memory values are mutually interlinked. As far as I can see, it makes Danziger’s book 
one of a kind in that it situates memory and remembering within the context of such a 
multifaceted historical episteme (which we might want to see as also encompassing lit-
erature and the arts that, particularly since modernism, have advanced our knowledge of 
the intricacies of human memory practices and their narrative fabric perhaps more than 
anything else).
Consider just one element of such interlinking: mnemonic values. Danziger describes 
them as culturally grounded assumptions about what is worth remembering, what ought not 
to be or need not to be remembered, what kinds of tasks practices of remembrance should 
be expected to serve. It is indeed hard to find a memory concept, a metaphor, a theory, an 
experiment, or a fMRI brain scan that does not echo cultural values. Ancient Greek writers 
expected memory (anamnesis) to offer a contemplative way to the deepest and primordial 
truths; Romans wanted it to be a rhetorical expedient for legal and political debates; the 
medieval cultivation of monastic memory was meant to foster the virtuous life and valued 
remembering as an act of emotional and spiritual immersion; the Renaissance practitioner 
of mnemotechnics, the “art of memory,” appreciated memory as an intellectual construct, 
an object of deliberate invention meant to improve mnemonic and imaginative skills.
Again an entire new set of mnemonic values came about with the Industrial Revolution 
and the period of European Enlightenment. Rather than existential reflection, moral 
improvement, or aid for dialectical intellectual exercises, memory’s significance now was 
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to provide accurate factual knowledge. It was expected to work like a mechanical archive, 
a copying machine. This idea was in line with the influential empiricist view of memory 
as a inner storage for copies of sensory impressions and, at the same time, related to the 
new visual and auditory recording devices (such as camera and phonograph) and other 
technologies demanded by the expanding industrial and commercial institutions. On the 
“subjective side,” this kind of memory work was supported by new educational institu-
tions and methods and, not least, by the emerging academic discipline of psychology. In 
Ebbinghaus’s memory experiments, which became the model for modern memory experi-
mentation, the aim was not to investigate actual experiences of remembering or forgetting 
but to demonstrate successes (and failures) in accomplishing very specific memory tasks. 
As a consequence, the idea of a reified memory that was separated from the psychological, 
material, social, and cultural contexts in which people remember and forget became the 
hallmark of experimental psychology.
One great strength of the historical approach is that it reveals what Danziger calls the 
impermanence of human constructions. It anchors them in time, a time that is, as we know, 
always changing. Looking, from Danziger’s perspective, at the present cultural episteme 
of memory and the many old and new fields of investigation that are part of it, it seems 
that the concept of memory is changing again. But this time, the change may be more 
profound and far-reaching than before; in fact, here we are dealing with a third meaning 
of historization, a third level on which the historical nature of memory is laid open. 
Neurosciences, new digital memory technologies, social and cultural memory studies, 
literature and the arts (and the investigation of their nexus with mind and culture): what 
recent developments in all of these fields appear to be radically challenging is the very 
notion of memory as an ontological entity on its own, a notion whose constitution in 
Western culture Danziger has reconstructed and whose variations run through the entire 
historical period he has covered in his book.
Challenged together with this notion is the idea that the complexity of the numerous 
forms and practices of human remembering can be explained in terms of storage and 
retrieval operations of an individual mind or brain, that is, as the workings of a particular 
archival entity in which “information” is “encoded,” “stored,” and “retrieved,” to use 
again the traditional vocabulary. Instead, the focus shifts to remembering and forgetting 
as embedded activities that, mediated by mnemonic artifacts, sign and symbols systems, 
are carried out by people, and not brains, people who live in buzzing social and cultural 
worlds. To understand this present transformation of the notion of memory—which may 
result in its dissolution as such—as well as its many previous changes, Danziger’s book 
is invaluable. Its originality, scholarship, and sophistication make it a classic both for 
Greek and Roman readers.
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